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INTRODUCTION
ilateral tax treaties are the backbone of the international
tax regime.1At least in broad strokes, the substance of this
international tax regime has been remarkably consistent.2 Re-
cent years, however, have seen a dramatic increase in treaty
abuse by taxpayers3 to such an extent that the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) expressed
concern that “the bilateral structure of the international tax re-
gime has lost its integrity.”4
Jurisdictions have the right to terminate tax treaties, subject
to minimal procedural constraints.5 Nonetheless, even in the
face of overwhelming evidence of treaty abuse, tax treaties are
1. See REUVEN AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 3 (2007) (“The claim the interna-
tional tax regime exists . . . rests mainly on the bilateral tax treaty network . .
. .”).
2. According to Avi-Yonah, this regime is comprised of two principles. The
first principle is the single tax principle, which states that income from cross
border transactions is taxed once (not more, but also not less than once). Id. at
8. The second principle is the benefits principle, which states that the source
jurisdiction gets primary right of taxation on active income and the residence
jurisdiction gets the primary right of taxation on passive income. Id. at 11.
3. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
identified treaty abuse as one of the target areas of the project to prevent base
erosion and profit shifting. See ORG. FORECON. CO-OPERATION&DEV. [OECD],
PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE
CIRCUMSTANCES, ACTION 6 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015).
4. Yariv Brauner,What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 92 (2014).
5. For model termination articles, see MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT
TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 31 (ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV. 2014) [hereinafter OECDMODEL CONVENTION].
B
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rarely terminated. The reason for rarely terminating treaties
seems to be that potential responses to abusive treaty-based tax
schemes are perceived to be hierarchical.6 Jurisdictions are ex-
pected to respond to abusive schemes in an escalating manner,
adopting harsher measures if previously adopted methods failed
to solve the problem. In this context, a termination of a tax
treaty is viewed as a last resort measure, only to be adopted if
all other policy responses fail.
This article argues that the hierarchical view of unilateral re-
sponses to treaty abuse is misguided. Unilateral responses to
treaty-based abuse are not hierarchically ordered. Rather, the
approach to treaty abuse should be functional and adopt specific
types of unilateral responses based on the type of treaty abuse
at issue. In order to advance this argument, this article develops
a taxonomy of tax-treaty abuses based on two factors: a geo-
graphical breadth of abuse, and a substantive breadth of abuse.
The geographical breadth of abuse considers the number of trea-
ties being abused. Namely, whether there are only a few treaties
being abused, or whether there are many treaties that are con-
sistently being abused. The second factor—namely, the substan-
tive breadth of abuse—considers whether there are only one or
two provisions consistently being abused, or whether the treaty
as a whole is used as an instrument of abuse.
Different combinations of geographical and substantive
breadths of abuse ultimately call for different unilateral re-
sponses. Within this context, treaty termination should not be
viewed as a “last resort”measure. Sometimes it is simply a first-
best (if not the only) solution. Specifically, if the abuse is geo-
graphically narrow (meaning, only one treaty is abused), but
substantively broad (meaning, the treaty as a whole is primarily
used for abusive purposes), a treaty should be terminated. In
such circumstances, termination is the most cost-effective way
to solve the abuse problem. On the other hand, termination
might be an irrelevant response in other instances, for example,
when multiple treaties are narrowly abused.
This article proceeds as follows: Part I explains the resistance
to treaty termination. Part II explores the different types of
available unilateral responses to treaty abuse (including termi-
nations), by surveying past unilateral responses by the United
States to treaty abuse. Part III categorizes the U.S. responses
6. See discussion infra Part I.
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based on geographical breadth and substantive types of abuse,
and explains the circumstances that warrant each type of re-
sponse.
I. THEHIERARCHICAL VIEW OFUNILATERAL RESPONSE TO
TREATY ABUSE
Asserting that the abuse of bilateral treaties threatens the in-
tegrity of the international tax regime7 may seem paradoxical at
first: since tax treaties are bilateral instruments, treaty abuse
can theoretically be easily and efficiently dealt with, without
threatening the bilateral structure of the international tax re-
gime.8 If a bilateral tax treaty is heavily abused, the offended
jurisdiction can simply exercise its right to terminate the treaty.9
The termination of such treaty would solve the abuse problem in
that specific context, while sending a strong message to taxpay-
ers, as well as other treaty partners, that abuse will not be tol-
erated. Moreover, a termination of one treaty (or even dozens)
out of thousands of bilateral treaties currently in place world-
wide, should not threaten the systemic integrity of the interna-
tional tax regime.10
Tax treaties are rarely terminated, however, even when
clearly abused by taxpayers. For example, the United States has
unilaterally terminated bilateral tax treaties only on very few
occasions.11 Recently, notwithstanding the mounting evidence of
treaty abuse, the U.S. Department of Treasury (the “Treasury”)
strongly resisted the idea of treaty terminations, referring to it
as a “nuclear weapon.”12
The resistance to treaty termination is not unique to the
United States. The OECD recently adopted a set of recommen-
dations following the massive Base Erosion and Profit Sharing
7. Brauner, supra note 4.
8. Id. Generally, treaty abuse is viewed as an issue best addressed by
changes to domestic law, for example, by adding domestic anti-abuse rules that
address treaty-based abuse. Id. Changes in the domestic laws of one or a few
countries, or terminations of a few treaties by one country, are unlikely to have
an immediate systemic effect on the network of bilateral tax treaties. Id.
(“[T]reaty abuse generally has been considered a domestic law issue.”).
9. Treaties typically contain termination articles. See OECD MODEL
CONVENTION, supra note 5.
10. See Brauner, supra note 4.
11. See discussion infra Part II.D.
12. Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Who’s Willing to Sign New U.S. Treaty
Provisions?, 79 TAXNOTES INT’L 192, 194 (2015).
2016] Treaty Terminations 1161
Project (“BEPS Project”) aimed at curtailing tax avoidance.13 Ac-
tion 6 of the OECD’s BEPS Project is specifically aimed at com-
bating treaty abuse.14 This effort is quite remarkable in the
sense that addressing treaty abuse has been historically viewed
as a domestic issue, and the project marked the first coordinated
international attempt focused on treaty abuse. But even though
Action 6 recognizes that “each country has the sovereign right”
to terminate a treaty,15 it forcefully states that treaty termina-
tion is a “last resort” option in responding to treaty abuse.16
Thus, it seems that developed jurisdictions take the view that
the termination of a tax treaty should be taken as a final meas-
ure when other responses to treaty abuse have failed. This
paints unilateral responses to treaty abuse as a set of hierarchal
options, gradually escalating in severity, with termination being
the last available option. This article puts unilateral responses
to treaty terminations in coherent policy terms, and suggests
that there is no such hierarchy. Instead, different responses are
suitable for different types of abuse.
II. THEUNITED STATES’ EXPERIENCE IN RESPONDING TO
TREATY ABUSE
This Part offers a menu of unilateral responses available for
treaty abuse through case studies involving the United States.
The unilateral responses to treaty abuse discussed herein in-
clude: overrides, renegotiations, turnoff provisions, and termi-
nations. This Part explains the different circumstances under
which the United States adopted each of the four policy instru-
ments. The survey indicates that these policy instruments were
not part of a hierarchical set of responses.
A. Treaty Overrides
A treaty override is domestic legislation that has the effect of
undoing treaty provisions.17 In the United States, treaties and
13. For more information and access to BEPS Project documents, see Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm (last visited May 22, 2016).
14. See generally OECD, supra note 3.
15. Id. at 15.
16. Id. at 103.
17. In at least one instance, the Treasury overrode treaties by administra-
tive action in the context of conduit financing arrangements. See Treas. Reg. §
1.881-3 (2012). However, the regulations were promulgated under the broad
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legislation have the same authoritative power.18 It is well estab-
lished that, where two equally authoritative rules contradict
each other, the rule enacted later-in-time takes precedent.19 This
interpretative doctrine gives Congress the ability to override
treaties by a later-in-time law. The United States has been quite
active in legislating treaty overrides,20 a practice that has drawn
some criticism.21 The Branch Profits Tax (“BPT”) example can
help to illustrate the United States’ use of overrides.
All treaties to which the United States is a signatory specify
that a treaty resident’s business income shall only be taxed in
the United States if the income is attributable to the resident’s
“permanent establishment” in the United States.22 A domestic
corporation, wholly owned by such foreign resident, is generally
not considered to be a permanent establishment.23 Income at-
tributable to a permanent establishment is thus taxed once to
the foreign resident.
If, in the alternative, a foreign resident operates in the United
States through a wholly owned domestic corporation, the domes-
tic corporation is subject to the usual corporate tax in the United
States. Upon repatriation of dividends from the corporation to
the foreign resident, the dividend is subject to a gross withhold-
ing tax (the rate of which varies among treaties).24 The income
is thus taxed twice.
This U.S. treaty system closely follows the U.S. domestic sys-
tem of taxation: proprietors are taxed once on income they gen-
erate directly, while corporate income is subject to two levels of
authority of I.R.C. § 7701(l), which itself may be understood to instruct the
Treasury to override treaties.
18. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
19. For a discussion of the later-in-time rule in the context of tax treaties,
see Anthony Infanti, United States, in TAX TREATIES AND DOMESTIC LAW ¶
13.1.2 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2006).
20. Id.
21. For a summary of the negative view of treaty overrides, see Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, Treaty Overrides: A Qualified Defense of U.S. Practice, in TAX
TREATIES ANDDOMESTIC LAW ¶ 4.2 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2006).
22. U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 7(1) (U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY 2006).
23. In such a case, the domestic corporation itself is a tax resident in the
United States under the treaty. Id. art. 4(1). As such, the domestic corporation
is subject to corporate taxes in the United States.
24. Id. art. 10.
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tax, once at the corporate level and another at the shareholder
level upon distribution or disposition.
Before 1986, foreign residents with active business in the
United States generally operated through wholly owned corpo-
rate subsidiaries in order to enjoy limited liability.25 This meant
that foreign investors from treaty jurisdictions were usually sub-
ject to two levels of tax. This status quo was disrupted with the
rise of the Limited Liability Company (LLC) during the early
1980s.
While a LLC accords its members all the benefits of limited
liability, a wholly owned LLC is generally disregarded for tax
purposes.26 During the 1980s, foreign residents from treaty ju-
risdictions started to use LLCs instead of domestic corporations
in conducting their U.S.-based activities. Because the LLCs were
disregarded for tax purposes, the foreign residents were only
taxed in the United States on profits generated by permanent
establishments. Repatriation of funds was not taxed again be-
cause a LLC was not a corporation, and repatriation from a LLC
was not a “dividend” subject to withholding under any of the tax
treaties then in force. Operating through a LLC, thus, enabled
foreign residents to operate in the United States with the bene-
fits of limited liability, but without the need to incorporate a do-
mestic subsidiary, which enabled the avoidance of the dividend
withholding tax.27 The United States, however, never intended
treaties to be used as an instrument to avoid the second level of
tax on corporate distributions. In 1986, the United States re-
sponded by adding to its tax code section 884, known as the BPT.
The BPT creates a withholding mechanism on branch earnings
repatriated from the United States to a foreign parent.28 The
25. For a discussion about the historical background of the enactment of the
Branch Profits Tax, see, for example, Omri Marian & Yariv Brauner, United
States, in DEPARTURES FROM THE OECD MODEL AND COMMENTARIES:
RESERVATIONS, OBSERVATIONS ANDPOSITIONS INEULAW ANDTAXTREATIES 537,
549–50 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2014); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at
92–96.
26. Under the default rule prescribed in the regulations, a single-owner LLC
is disregarded for tax purposes. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(ii) (2012).
27. For further discussion, see supra note 25.
28. Generally, under the mechanism prescribed by I.R.C. § 884, a reduction
in a foreign corporation’s net U.S. assets is treated as a “dividend equivalent
amount.” Such amount is subject to a 30 percent gross taxation, unless a tax
treaty modifies that rate.
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BPT was intended to fix the discrepancy between foreign corpo-
rations operating in the United States through LLCs, and those
operating through domestic corporate subsidiaries. The BPT ef-
fectively functions as a proxy to a second level of tax on corporate
distributions from the foreign parent to its shareholders. The
problem, however, was that U.S. treaties did not prescribe any
tax on business income except from the taxes imposed on perma-
nent establishments. In fact, some U.S. treaties at the time ex-
plicitly prohibited a second level of tax on foreign corporate dis-
tributions to foreign shareholders.29 The BPT has effectively
overridden the treaties then in effect. Subsequently, the United
States renegotiated all of its tax treaties to insert a BPT provi-
sion.
B. Renegotiations
The United States has renegotiated its tax treaties on various
occasions. Broadly speaking, such renegotiations take one of two
forms. The first, referred to as “extensive renegotiations,” occurs
when there is a renegotiation of many tax treaties to address a
problem shared by all renegotiated treaties. The other form of
renegotiation refers to the renegotiation of a particular provision
or a particular treaty. Each of the two types of renegotiations is
separately discussed below.
1. Extensive Renegotiations
Over the years, the United States experienced many instances
in which taxpayers from non-treaty jurisdictions “bought” their
way into treaties through a process known as “treaty shopping.”
In the past, if a resident from a non-treaty jurisdiction wished to
invest in the United States but wanted to enjoy treaty benefits,
the foreign resident could incorporate a shell corporation in a
treaty jurisdiction, and make the U.S. investment through such
corporation. As a tax resident in a treaty jurisdiction, the wholly
owned corporation (and by extension, the non-treaty owner)
would reap treaty benefits. The result was that “[in] the most
extreme case of treaty shopping, it mean[t] we ha[d] a treaty
29. See Marian & Brauner, supra note 25, at 550 (“[T]he BPT effectively
imposed a second level of tax on the branch in lieu of second level of tax on
distribution, where treaty provisions were specifically drafted to prevent a sec-
ond level of tax on such distributions.”).
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with the world.”30 This was not a desirable result, since “third
country nationals’ use of the U.S. treaty network reduce[d] the
incentive to governments outside the U.S. treaty network to ne-
gotiate treaties with the United States that offer[ed] concessions
to U.S. nationals.”31
The main innovation of U.S. tax treaty policy in this context
was the introduction of Limitation on Benefits (“LOB”) article in
all U.S. treaties. This has been achieved through extensive re-
negotiations of all existing treaties.32 The LOB provision is re-
garded as the “ultimate anti-abuse rule.”33 LOB provisions pre-
scribe qualification rules that are intended to prevent corporate
taxpayers who lack sufficient connections to the treaty jurisdic-
tions from receiving treaty benefits.
The creation of the LOB policy is commonly attributed to Aiken
Industries v. Commissioner.34 In Aiken Industries, a Bahamian
parent corporation made a loan to its U.S. subsidiary. Under
U.S. law at the time, interest paid to a foreign resident was sub-
ject to gross withholding at a rate of 30 percent.35 Such withhold-
ing is many times relieved by tax treaties. The United States
and the Bahamas, however, did not have a tax treaty in place.
In order to avoid withholding, the Bahamian parent assigned its
rights to receive interest under the loan to one of its other sub-
sidiaries, a Honduran corporation. The United States did have a
tax treaty with Honduras at the time under which interest pay-
ments were exempt from withholding.
The U.S. subsidiary paid a deductible interest to the Honduran
subsidiary, thus eliminating some of the U.S. tax base. The Hon-
duran subsidiary immediately turned and made a back-to-back
payment to the Bahamian parent. The U.S. subsidiary claimed
it was not required to withhold on the deductible payments made
to Honduras under the Honduran treaty then in effect. The Tax
30. Jeff Gerth,U.S. is Opening Talks on Tax Haven Treaty, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
15, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/01/15/business/us-is-opening-talks-
on-tax-haven-treaty.html?pagewanted=1 (quoting Alan W. Granwell, the
Treasury Department’s international tax counsel at the time).
31. R. Eliot Rosen, U.S. Files Notice of BVI Treaty Termination, 16 TAX
NOTES 77, 78 (1982).
32. SeeMarian & Brauner, supra note 25, at 559–60.
33. Id. at 559.
34. Aiken Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 925 (1971).
35. I.R.C. § 871 (1986).
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Court rejected this argument, concluding that the Honduran cor-
poration “was merely a conduit for the passage of interest pay-
ments from [the U.S. subsidiary] to [the Bahamian parent], and
it cannot be said to have received the interest as its own.”36
The case, however, was a Pyrrhic victory for the IRS. The de-
cision provided taxpayers with a roadmap to avoid the classifi-
cation as a “conduit.” In Aiken, the back-to-back amounts were
identical. After Aiken, taxpayers engaged in similar intermedi-
ary financing arrangements that withstood court scrutiny,
among others, by allocating a small margin of profit to be kept
by the conduit intermediaries that were incorporated in treaty
jurisdictions.37 One well-known example is SDI Netherlands v.
Commissioner.38 In SDI, a Bermudian corporation that owned
certain IP rights protected in the United States licensed such
rights to an affiliate in the Netherlands, which relicensed them
to a U.S. affiliate. The U.S. affiliate paid royalties to the Neth-
erlands, which made a back-to-back payment of royalties to Ber-
muda. Had the U.S. affiliate paid the royalties directly to Ber-
muda, they would have been subject to a 30 percent withholding
tax. The payment to the Netherlands, however, was exempt un-
der the treaty in force at the time between the United States and
the Netherlands. The IRS failed to convince the Tax Court that
the arrangement was a sham because, among other reasons, the
Dutch entity did keep a small taxable spread in the Nether-
lands.39 The immediate response of the Treasury was to renego-
tiate the tax treaty with the Netherlands to include a strict LOB
provision.
However, the treaty-shopping problem was much wider than
just the Netherlands or the Honduras treaties. Over the years,
the IRS made several administrative attempts to address treaty
36. Aiken Industries, 56 T.C. at 934.
37. Since then, the IRS has promulgated regulations to combat such per-
ceived abuse as well. See supra note 17.
38. See, e.g., SDI Netherlands v. Comm’r, 107. T.C. 161 (1996).
39. Id. at 175–76 (“The schedules of royalty payments provided for a spread,
. . . which compensated petitioner for its efforts . . . . Under the circumstances
herein, we think these arrangements should be accorded separate status with
the result that, although the royalties paid by petitioner to SDI Bermuda were
derived from the royalties received by petitioner from SDI USA, they were sep-
arate payments.”).
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shopping,40 but faced an uphill battle due to the fact that treaties
explicitly granted benefits, but did not impose specific residency
qualification requirements. The United States therefore had no
choice but “to battle treaty-shopping head-on by negotiating it
away in its tax treaties.”41 Each treaty signed after Aiken in-
cluded a LOB provision, and existing treaties have since been
renegotiated to include such provisions.
2. Targeted Renegotiations
Renegotiations of treaties can also be targeted to a particular
provision in the context of a specific treaty. For example, in 2007
the United States and Canada signed a protocol to the U.S.-Can-
ada treaty amending the treatment of hybrid entities. Hybrid
entities are entities that are treated as corporations by one ju-
risdiction, but as a tax-transparent entities in the other jurisdic-
tion.42
Until then, taxpayers were able to use hybrid entities to gen-
erate deductions in one jurisdiction with no corresponding inclu-
sions in the other.43 For example, a U.S. parent corporation
would make a loan to a wholly owned Canadian Unlimited Lia-
bility Company (“ULC”). The ULC would be treated as a corpo-
ration for Canadian purposes, but as a disregarded entity for
U.S. purposes. Thus, interest payments made from the ULC
were deductible in Canada, reducing tax liability in Canada. Un-
der the treaty, the ULC was not required to withhold on the in-
terest payment made to the United States. In the United States,
however, the payments did not create income to the parent, be-
cause being made from a disregarded entity, the payments never
functionally happened from a U.S. point of view. From a U.S. tax
perspective, the payments looked like a transfer of money be-
tween two bank accounts owned by the same entity. This type of
40. The IRS issued several rulings aimed at denying treaty benefits in abu-
sive circumstances. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381; Rev. Rul. 84-
153, 1984-2 C.B. 383.
41. Marian & Brauner, supra note 25, at 560.
42. Protocol Amending the Convention Between Canada and the United
States of America with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Can.-U.S.,
Sept. 21, 2007, S. TREATYDOC. NO. 110-15 (2008).
43. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., JCX-57-08,
EXPLANATION OFPROPOSEDPROTOCOL TO THE INCOMETAXTREATYBETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES ANDCANADA 40–41 (2008).
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planning was available due to unique differences between Cana-
dian and U.S. entity classification rules, and it made sense to
address them through renegotiation.44
C. Turn-off Provisions
In many instances, it is possible to deal with particular issues
in advance. For example, if specific provisions of a tax treaty are
more prone to abuse than others, it is possible to rig the treaty
with “fail-safe” mechanisms that automatically “turn off” treaty
benefits if specific conditions are met. The United States had
done so on a few occasions.
For example, the treaty between the United States and Lux-
embourg provides special anti-abuse provisions for “triangular
permanent establishments.” Generally, if a U.S. resident oper-
ates in Luxembourg through permanent establishment, Luxem-
bourg gets the primary right to tax such profits.45 The United
States, however, agrees to give up taxation of its residents under
the assumption that Luxembourg will tax them.
Yet, it is possible for a taxpayer to make deductible payments
out of the Luxembourg permanent establishment to another
Luxembourg treaty partner (not the United States), thus elimi-
nating the tax in Luxembourg without necessarily creating a
corresponding inclusion. In order to prevent that, the treaty with
Luxembourg contains a provision that “turns off” treaty benefits
for a permanent establishment if the permanent establishment
is not subject to a minimum threshold of taxation where it oper-
ates.46
The United States recently introduced a similar concept into
its proposed revisions to the U.S. Model Treaty.47 Under the
44. The United States previously overrode treaties due to concerns regard-
ing the use of hybrid entities. See I.R.C. § 894(c). This rule, however, was not
broad enough to address some of the same concerns in the context of the U.S.-
Canada Treaty.
45. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income and Capital, Lux.-U.S., art. 9, Apr. 3, 1996, S. TREATYDOC. NO. 104-
33 (1996).
46. Id. art. 22.
47. U.S.MODEL INCOMETAXCONVENTION (U.S.DEP’T OF THETREASURY 2016)
[hereinafter U.S. MODEL]. For discussion of such fail-safe mechanisms, see Al-
lison Christians & Alexander Ezenagu, Kill-Switches in the New U.S. Model
Tax Treaty, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1043 (2016).
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Model Treaty, certain treaty benefits are “turned off” if, after the
treaty has entered into force, the other contracting state intro-
duces a “Special Tax Regime” (“SPR”).48 A SPR is “any statute,
regulation or administrative practice that provides a preferen-
tial effective rate of taxation to such income or profit, including
through reductions in the tax rate or the tax base” which results
in certain tax benefits such as preferential tax rates or a perma-
nent deduction.49 This provision expresses the belief that treaty
benefits in one country (in this case, the United States) should
only be granted under the premise that the benefited stream of
income will be taxed in the other jurisdiction.
D. Terminations
Occasionally, the United States has terminated tax treaties
unilaterally for political reasons, such as terminating a tax
treaty with South Africa during the Apartheid period.50 Such
terminations are not responding to treaty abuse, and as such are
not discussed. Terminations due to treaty abuses are few and far
between. Several such instances are explored below.
1. The Termination of the British Virgin Islands Extension in
the U.K. Treaty
In 1979, the Treasury announced that it intended to renegoti-
ate the territorial extension of the U.K. treaty to the British Vir-
gin Islands (BVI)51 and in early 1981 a new treaty was an-
nounced. In September of 1981, however, the Treasury asked the
Senate to suspend its consideration of the ratification of the
newly negotiated treaty.52 According to the Treasury, the pend-
ing treaty was designed to prevent, or at least limit, the extent
to which residents of third countries could access U.S. treaty
benefits. In reviewing the newly negotiated treaty, the Treasury
concluded that the opportunities for such an abuse remained
“too great to tolerate.”53
48. U.S. MODEL, supra note 47, art. 3(1)(1).
49. Id.
50. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001–5117 (1986)
(repealed 1993).
51. Letter from John E. Chapoton, Assistant Sec’y for Tax Policy, Treasury
Dep’t, to Charles H. Percy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations
(Sept. 15, 1981), reprinted in 13 TAXNOTES 645 (1981).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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The Treasury’s fears of the BVI treaty being used for treaty-
shopping schemes were well-grounded. For example, during the
1970s, non-treaty investors in U.S. real estate structured their
investments using BVI shell corporations.54 The BVI entity
would finance the U.S. real estate investment with debt, interest
on which would be deductible in the United States. This elimi-
nated some of the U.S. tax base. No income would be subject to
tax in the BVI, since the BVI was a tax haven. The BVI shell
corporation would pay the interest receipts from the United
States back-to-back to the non-treaty jurisdiction. Had such pay-
ments been made directly to the non-treaty jurisdiction, they
would have been subject to a 30 percent gross withholding tax.
Moreover, being a tax haven jurisdiction with strict bank secrecy
laws, it was possible for U.S. taxpayers to “round trip” their do-
mestic investment through the BVI corporation (meaning, a U.S.
person would invest in the United States through a wholly
owned BVI corporation) without the IRS ever knowing about it.
In effect, it enabled U.S. taxpayers to enjoy treaty benefits in a
purely domestic context.
Consequently, the Treasury reopened negotiations with the
BVI with the key issue being an anti-abuse provision that was
intended to prevent non-treaty residents from avoiding U.S.
withholding taxes by claiming BVI-treaty residency. The rene-
gotiation eventually reached an impasse after the BVI resisted
the insertion of an anti-treaty-shopping provision.55 In response,
the Treasury decided to terminate the treaty.56
54. For a discussion of tax planning schemes involving real estate invest-
ment financed through the BVI, see Richard L. Reinhold, What Is Tax Treaty
Abuse? (Is Treaty Shopping an Outdated Concept?), 53 TAX LAW. 663, 665–67
(2000).
55. On February 24, 1982, the Chief Minister of the BVI issued a statement
indicating that the negotiations were at an impasse. According to the Minister,
the United States insisted on including an anti-abuse provision in the treaty
to prevent treaty shopping by third country nationals, but the BVI resisted
that step. See Rosen, supra note 31, at 77.
56. In a U.S. Department of State letter dated June 23, 1982 to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee informing it of Treasury’s decision to terminate
the extension of the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty to the BVI, Daniel W. McGovern, the
Deputy Legal Adviser, noted the decision to terminate was ultimately
grounded in the Treasury’s report following review that the current treaty in-
dicates potential for tax abuse. On June 30, 1982, the U.S. Department of State
filed an official notice with the British Embassy in Washington, indicating that
the United States would terminate the extension of the U.S.-U.K. income tax
treaty to the BVI effective January 1, 1983. Speaking on June 24, 1982 at the
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2. The Mid-1980s Terminations of Caribbean and African Ter-
ritorial Extensions
On January 1, 1983, the Treasury announced that it will ter-
minate, as of January 1, 1984, the extensions of old tax treaties
to over a dozen British and Belgian jurisdictions, primarily lo-
cated in the Caribbean.57 According to the press release, the ter-
minations occurred because the existence of the territorial ex-
tensions did not reflect the economic relationship between the
United States and these respective jurisdictions, and were sus-
ceptible to abuse.58
Responding to congressional inquiry, the Treasury reasoned
that, given the earlier termination of the treaty with the BVI (as
well as renegotiations that resulted in the inclusion of anti-
abuse provisions in other treaties), there was a concern that the
territorial extensions at issue would replace the recently termi-
nated BVI treaty as instruments of tax abuse.59 Unlike the BVI
case, however, the Treasury did not attempt to renegotiate the
territorial extensions at issue, but immediately terminated
them. The reasoning was that “[f]or the most part these treaties
were not being used; there [was] very little investment flow be-
tween the United States and these jurisdictions.”60
The minimal flow of true investment between the United
States and these jurisdictions, combined with the fact that such
Fourth Annual Institute on Multinational Taxation, the Treasury’s Interna-
tional Tax Counsel, Alan W. Granwell, said that a tax treaty is a “bilateral
relationship between the contracting jurisdictions,” and if persons who are not
residents of the jurisdictions can obtain benefits under the treaty, “it creates
tensions between the law on the books and treaty use.” Id. at 78.
57. I.R.S. News Release R-2222 (July 1, 1983). The territories with which
territorial extensions were terminated were Anguilla, Rwanda, Barbados, St.
Christopher, Belize, Nevis, Burundi, St. Lucia, Dominica, St. Vincent, Falk-
land Islands, the Grenadines, the Gambia, Seychelles, Grenada, Sierra Leone,
Malawi, Zambia, Montserrat, and Zaire. Id.
58. Id.
59. Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan explained why the Treasury termi-
nated the BVI treaty by responding to inquiries from a member of the Senate’s
Finance Committee. See Secretary Regan On Termination of Caribbean Tax
Treaties, 22 TAX NOTES 640, 641 (1984) (“The Treasury Department’s action
was intended to address current abuse and, significantly, the potential for fu-
ture abuse following the termination of the British Virgin Islands treaty and
the renegotiation of the Netherlands Antilles treaty.”).
60. Id.
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jurisdictions were de facto tax havens, led the Treasury to be-
lieve that such jurisdictions might become dependent upon in-
come deriving from abusive activities. The concern, in other
words, was that the treaties would be used primarily for abuse,
rather than for legitimate investments.61
Under such circumstances, renegotiations were viewed nega-
tively. The Treasury reasoned that past experience in renegoti-
ating treaties “has shown that if the existing treaties remain in
force during renegotiations, the treaty partner will underesti-
mate the seriousness of the U.S. concern and will also lengthen
the renegotiation process as long as possible. This has the ad-
verse consequences of allowing treaty abuses to continue.”62 Re-
negotiation is called for, according to the Treasury, only in cases
where “establishing a treaty relationship . . . promotes real eco-
nomic activities of residents of the two jurisdictions.”63
The Treasury also explained that the treaty terminations may
serve a purpose beyond eliminating the particular abuse at is-
sue. Termination “sends the clearest possible signal to present
or potential treaty partners . . . that the United States is serious
about its intent to curtail treaty shopping.”64
61. In hearings, which took place throughout September 1987 before the
House of Representatives’ Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Op-
erations, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy of the Department of Treasury,
Donald Chapoton, submitted prepared statements and responses to subcom-
mittee requests. When questioned about the reasons for terminating the 1945
Income Tax Convention between the United States and the United Kingdom,
and the 1948 Income Tax Convention between the United States and Belgium,
Chapoton stated:
Moreover, there was apparently little use of the treaties by residents
of these jurisdictions. In addition, the treaties did not contain safe-
guards against use by third country residents to obtain U.S. tax ben-
efits. Although these treaties had not yet been widely used by third
country residents, there was an indication that such use was growing.
See International Tax Evasion/Tax Treaty Issues: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Gov’t Operations, 100th Cong. 60 (1987) (statement of Donald
Chapoton, Acting Assistant Sec’y on Tax Policy, Treasury Dep’t) [hereinafter
Chapoton Statement].
62. Supra note 59.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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3. The Netherlands Antilles Treaty Termination
On June 29, 1987, the Treasury announced that the United
States delivered notices to the Netherlands of the termination of
the extension of the 1948 income tax treaty as it applied to the
Netherlands Antilles. In accordance with the terms of the treaty,
the termination was to be effective as of January 1, 1988.65 In a
letter, J. Roger Mentz, Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy, wrote
that the termination of the treaty “represents a positive step in
this Administration’s efforts to eliminate opportunities for abuse
of the United States income tax treaties through treaty shop-
ping, the practice by which residents of third countries establish
or use entities in a treaty country to derive income from United
States investments under the treaty’s favorable tax terms.”66
At the time, the Antilles functioned as an offshore center for
foreign investment in the United States. The Antilles also played
a crucial role in U.S. companies’ Eurobond financing.67 Although
the Antilles levied only nominal taxes on the tax haven business,
“the volume of U.S. financing through the Antilles was so great
that it produced 25–30% of [the] islands’ total tax revenues.”68
Meanwhile, the amount of U.S. revenue lost through this haven
was estimated to be between $700 million to $1 billion.69
For eight years prior to the termination of the treaty, the
Treasury tried to renegotiate a more restrictive treaty with the
Antilles, premised on the anti-treaty-shopping criteria in the
U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, as well as an exchange of infor-
mationmechanisms.70 The negotiations failed due to “the unwill-
ingness of Treasury to tolerate an increase in treaty shopping
for which the Antilles lobbied.”71
65. U.S. Tax Treaties Rep. (CCH) 457.01, Aruban Income Tax Treaty:
Treaty Background (2016).
66. U.S. Tax Treaties Rep. (CCH) 458.80, Annotations: Termination (2016).
67. Gerth, supra note 30.
68. David R. Francis, US Tries to Stem Flow of US Tax Revenue Through
Antilles ‘Haven,’ CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 10 1984), http://www.csmoni-
tor.com/1984/0110/011047.html.
69. Id.
70. Frith Crandall, The Termination of the United States-Netherlands An-
tilles Tax Treaty: What Were the Costs of Ending Treaty Shopping, 9 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 355, 378 (1988).
71. Mark F. Johnson, Antilles Treaty Termination Favored, but Period of
Uncertainty in Bond Market Lies Ahead, 36 TAXNOTES 127, 129 (1987).
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Two months after the termination of the treaty, O. Donaldson
Chapoton, the Acting Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Pol-
icy, discussed the termination of the Netherlands Antilles treaty
at a Congressional hearing. He cited the primary reason for
seeking to renegotiate the Netherlands Antilles treaty related to
its potential for abuse by treaty shopping third-country inves-
tors.72 Mr. Chapoton noted that the principal objection to treaty
shopping was that it undermined the leverage the United States
would otherwise bring to negotiations for new or revised treaties
with the countries of residence of the treaty shoppers. It there-
fore posed a serious obstacle to the United States’ efforts to bar-
gain with trading partners for concessions, like low withholding
tax rates on income derived by U.S. persons from those jurisdic-
tions, which are so important to the international competitive
standing of U.S. multinationals. He also noted that the Antilles
treaty had been used by third-country residents for treaty shop-
ping more extensively than any other U.S. income tax treaty. He
presented data from IRS forms reporting income payments to
nonresidents for 1983 and 1984 to highlight the massive extent
to which third-country residents channeled their investments
into the United States through entities established in the Antil-
les.73
72. See Chapoton Statement, supra note 61, at 27 (“The primary reason for
seeking to renegotiate the Netherlands Antilles treaty related to its potential
for abuse by treaty-shopping third-country investors.”).
73. Id.Chapoton provided the following data regarding payments channeled
through the Antilles:
Payments of all types of U.S. source income subject to withholding to
residents of the Netherlands Antilles (a jurisdiction of approximately
one-quarter million people) were $2.1 billion, or 19 percent of the total
U.S. payments to all countries, in 1983. In 1984, payments to Antilles
residents were $2.8 billion, or 16.4 percent of such payments to the
world. With respect to interest, the comparable figures are even more
striking. In 1983, U.S. source interest payments of almost $2 billion,
or 33.4 percent of the total interest payments to the world of $5.9 bil-
lion, were made to residents of the Antilles. In 1984, this figure had
increased to $2.6 billion, or 26.2 percent of the total payments of $10
billion. This percentage decline for the Antilles probably reflects the
effect of the introduction, during 1984, of the U.S. exemption for port-
folio interest, which has lessened the need for use of the Antilles as a
route for issuing Eurobonds by U.S. companies.
To further highlight these interest figures, in 1983 interest pay-
ments to the Antilles exceeded the sum of interest payments to Can-
ada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France by $120 million. In
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4. The Malta Treaty Termination
On November 16, 1995, the United States announced it had
delivered a notice of termination relating to the tax treaty with
Malta.74 The reason was the “lack of a provision dealing with
limitation of benefits in the treaty.”75 The Treasury also stated
that the termination “provide[d] an example of Treasury’s com-
mitment to prevent misuse of income tax treaties by third coun-
try residents even if it means termination of long-standing rela-
tionships.”76
At the time, Malta changed its domestic tax law to allow “for-
eign-owned companies in Malta . . . to derive income from the
U.S. at a reduced tax rate specified in the double taxation treaty
and, therefore, effectively pay no tax in Malta.”77 This created a
strong incentive for treaty shopping. Aside from treaty shopping,
the United States was also concerned “that Malta was unable to
obtain and exchange tax information held by financial institu-
tions.”78 Under these circumstances, “the continuation of the
treaty with Malta was [regarded as] not consistent with U.S. tax
treaty policy.”79
III. A FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIZATION OFUNILATERAL
RESPONSES TO TREATY ABUSE
This Part offers a functional matrix of unilateral responses to
treaty abuse based on the U.S. experience, which is not based on
a hierarchy. In the alternative, it suggests that response to
1984, Antilles interest payments were 82 percent of the sum of the
interest payments to these four countries.
Id. at 28.
74. The Malta treaty has since been renegotiated, and the new treaty en-
tered into force on November 23, 2010. See Convention Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of Malta for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Re-
spect to Taxes on Income, Malta-U.S., Aug. 8, 2008, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 111-1
(2009) (entered into force Nov. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Tax Convention with
Malta].
75. Sindhu G. Hirani, U.S. Terminates Tax Treaty with Malta over Limita-
tion of Benefits Provision, DAILY TAXREP. (BNA) (Nov. 17, 1995).
76. Id.
77. Malta and the U.S. Start Talks to Terminate Double Tax Accord, 95 TAX
NOTES INT’L 244 (1995).
78. Tax Convention with Malta, supra note 74, at vi.
79. Hirani, supra note 75.
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treaty abuse should be categorized based on the identity of the
abuser, namely whether the abuser is a taxpayer or a treaty sig-
natory.
A. A Matrix of Responses
The U.S. experience of unilateral responses to treaty abuse is
telling. The survey in Part II does not paint a clear picture of a
hierarchy of responses. For example, one might expect negotia-
tions to be a “first step” that would precede any “harsher” re-
sponse, such as an override or termination. But, renegotiations
do not precede overrides. If anything, renegotiations come after
an override. This was the case with the BPT. Only after the
adoption of the BPT did the United States engage all of its treaty
partners to renegotiate BPT provisions into the treaties. Even
terminations are not always preceded by negotiations, as was
the case of the 1980s terminations of the Caribbean territorial
extensions. In that case, termination was the first and only re-
sponse.
Can this mixture of responses be explained? This article sug-
gests that U.S. responses to treaty abuse make a lot of sense once
a functional approach is adopted. Rather than a simple hierar-
chical view, the U.S. experience demonstrates that different
measures are adopted in response to different types of abuses,
and in different contexts. Specifically, the type of observed uni-
lateral responses seem to depend on two factors: the geograph-
ical breadth of the abuse, and the substantive type of the abuse.
Geographical breadth refers to whether the abuse is prevalent
across multiple treaties or whether it is confined to a particular
treaty (or very few treaties). The breadth of the substantive
abuse refers to whether the abuse makes use of specific treaty
provisions (for example withholding provisions), or whether tax-
payers abuse the treaty in general (that is, by treaty shopping,
where the treaty can be used in multiple schemes to avoid taxa-
tion). Based on the two factors, it is possible to build a matrix of
observed U.S. responses to treaty abuse.80
80. Obviously, a treaty can be abused in more than one way. The quadrants
above are a simplistic depiction of reality, and assume that the different types
of abuse are independent of one another, which is not necessarily the case. In
reality, since different types of abuse may occur simultaneously within the
same treaty or set of treaties, it is possible that one policy response is available
to address the abuses.
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Figure 1: Categorization of Unilateral Responses to Treaty
Abuse
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The matrix shows that available policy responses to treaty
abuse are taken under different circumstances. For example,
reference to treaty terminations as a “last resort” option is some-
what of a misnomer. Sometimes termination is simply the only
relevant response. In other instances; it is irrelevant. This is an
important observation, since viewing treaty termination as a
“last resort” option may instill an inherent bias against its use
as a policy instrument, even when termination is the correct ap-
proach to take. In the following sections, this article briefly dis-
cusses the quadrants of the matrix presented above. It explains
why each policy instrument may be preferable over other avail-
able choices in specific contexts.
1. Treaty Shopping Across Multiple Treaties: Renegotiate All
In a sense, this type of a problem is a worst case scenario: all
treaties are prone to abuse in ways we cannot really anticipate.
Renegotiation of all existing treaties to include LOB provisions
was the U.S. course of action once it became apparent that treaty
shopping was a systemic problem.
The main argument against such an approach is its cost. Re-
negotiation is time consuming and difficult to achieve. Addition-
ally, in the meantime, abuse may continue. There is no viable
alternative to systemic abuse (or the potential of systemic
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abuse), however, across multiple treaties. For example, one the-
oretical alternative would be to terminate all treaties (either by
way of termination notices or through overrides that comprehen-
sively deny treaty benefits), and to hope to renegotiate new ones.
The cost for such an action would be enormous, both economi-
cally and politically. From an economic point of view, such an
across-the-board move would surely be overkill. Most cross-bor-
der transactions are probably legitimate rather than abusive.
Multiple terminations, or a broad override, would deny treaty
benefits to many taxpayers that are legitimately engaged in
cross-border transactions involving treaty jurisdictions. The eco-
nomic result would likely be disastrous. Moreover, a one-swoop
cancellation of multiple treaties would completely tarnish the
reliability of the United States as a tax treaty partner (and
maybe even as a treaty partner in general).
Another alternative is to terminate a few particularly “bad”
treaties. This is unlikely to solve the problem because abusers
could simply replace terminated treaties with other treaties still
in effect that do not contain LOB provisions.
2. Particular Types of Abuse Across Multiple Treaties: Over-
rides
Could the United States have addressed the BPT issue differ-
ently? What other actions could the United States have taken in
response to the rise of the LLC, which in turn denied the United
States’ collection of dividend withholding taxes?
The option of treaty termination seems extreme in such a con-
text. First, since this was a problem for all treaties in place at
that time, it would require the termination of all treaties result-
ing with the problems noted above. In addition, treaty termina-
tions in such a case would be overbroad within the context of
each treaty. If the treaty generally functions properly, and there
is only one dysfunctional article prone to abuse (in that case, the
dividend withholding article), it seems extreme to terminate a
treaty and deny all other intended benefits that have nothing to
do with dividend withholding.
The United States could potentially renegotiate all treaties to
include BPT provisions (which the United States eventually did
after the enactment of the BPT). However, unlike in the context
of systemic abuse schemes discussed above, an override can be
targeted to address the specific abuse at issue, and be made im-
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mediately applicable to all treaties. This seems to provide a rel-
atively low cost way to quickly solve the problem and stop the
abuse.
There is still a political cost, of course, in overriding treaties.
The United States has indeed been criticized for its override
practices.81 But, given that the override addresses abuse, mean-
ing, instances where the treaties are used in unintended man-
ners, the political costs seem to have been bearable.82 In many
instances, overrides also address problems shared by the other
jurisdictions.83 In such circumstances, little resistance is ex-
pected.
3. Particular Abuse in One Treaty: Renegotiation or “Turn Off”
Provisions
A particular type of abuse in a specific treaty probably repre-
sents the easiest case for tax authorities. When one provision of
one treaty is consistently abused by bona fide residents of the
treaty jurisdiction, the obvious course of action is a targeted re-
negotiation of that specific provision.
Termination of the treaty seems extreme, as it denies all other
benefits of the treaty that are not associated with the particular
abuse. An override is also inapt, since it seems impossible to
draft legislation so narrow so as to target one type of abuse in
one treaty, without affecting other treaties.
If a particular treaty is known to be susceptible to abuse in
particular circumstances, it might be helpful to include safe-
guard mechanisms that automatically “turn off” treaty benefits
in response to a particular type of abuse. This can be tailored to
the particular context of each treaty, as was the case with the
Luxembourg treaty.84
81. See generally, e.g., Anthony C. Infanti, Curtailing Tax Treaty Overrides:
A Call to Action, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 677 (2001).
82. Avi-Yonah, among other scholars, supports treaty overrides based on
the argument that treaty partners usually face the same abuse problems and,
therefore, may be amenable to the override. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 21, at
65.
83. Id.
84. See supra Part II.C.
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4. Systemic Abuse of a Single Treaty: Renegotiation or Termi-
nation
The U.S. experience in treaty terminations tells a very partic-
ular story: treaties are terminated when, in the context of a par-
ticular treaty, two factors converge. The first factor involves
when the treaty is systematically abused (or has the potential
for systematic abuse). In some cases, such as in the BVI and the
Netherlands Antilles Treaties, the abuse seems to have been
supported (if not encouraged) by the treaty partner. The second
factor is that the abuse (or the potential for it) is large in com-
parison to any legitimate uses of the treaty. In such context, the
treaty functions primarily as an avoidance instrument, and not
as an instrument that alleviates double taxation and supports
investment.
It may be reasonable to renegotiate a treaty before terminat-
ing it. But, it does not seem necessary. In fact, negotiation may
only prolong the period of abuse. If it is apparent that a treaty
can only serve as an instrument of abuse, why have it at all?
Termination solves the problem immediately. At the same time,
few innocent taxpayers are harmed by the termination, since lit-
tle (if any) legitimate cross-border dealing is ongoing between
the treaty jurisdictions. For example, in the context of the Car-
ibbean extension terminations, the Treasury reasoned that
because of the minimal flows of investment between the United
States and these jurisdictions and because abuse of these trea-
ties by third country residents had not yet become widespread,
the economic impact would not be great. If, however, termina-
tions were delayed, and treaty shopping abuses became wide-
spread, there could be a far more severe impact.85
Not only that, the termination sends a strong message to both
taxpayers and treaty partners that abuse will not be tolerated.86
There is, of course, a potential political cost to termination.
When the United States terminated the BVI treaty, some mem-
bers of Congress were critical. It was suggested that the Treas-
ury’s decision “to request a renegotiation of the terms of the
treaty it agreed to only a few months earlier br[ought] into ques-
tion the country’s adherence to bilateral agreements which
85. See Regan, supra note 59.
86. Supra note 64.
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might have repercussions far beyond the circumstances of this
tax treaty.”87
Such fear is unfounded. The United States is hardly the only
country in the world that has to deal with tax avoidance and
evasion through tax havens. Other jurisdictions face the same
problem. It is more likely that such jurisdictions would view
treaty terminations with tax havens favorably, as it prevents
U.S.-based investors from using tax havens to avoid taxes in
other industrialized jurisdictions. The United States’ economic
relations with non-haven jurisdictions are much more substan-
tial than its relations with tax havens. The political gains of fa-
vorable perception by non-haven jurisdictions—appreciating the
fact the United States takes the lead in engaging a shared prob-
lem—likely outweighs any political repercussions.88
B. Government Abuses Versus Taxpayer Abuses
Another way to functionally categorize unilateral responses to
treaty abuse is based on the identity of the main offender.
Clearly, in all instances of abuse, taxpayers benefit from lower
tax bills. But in some instances, the abuse is encouraged, or even
facilitated, by the treaty partner (as thought to be the case of the
Netherlands Antilles treaty).
If taxpayers take advantage of a treaty in a manner that is
inconsistent with the intention of the treaty partners, the re-
sponse should be taxpayer focused. The idea here would be to
close loopholes, for example, through an override. However,
when a problem is persistent across multiple treaties and also
broad in scope, an override might not solve the problem. In such
a case, there is a need to renegotiate the treaties with all treaty
partners, such as in the case of the LOB provision. Since the in-
terests of the negotiating parties are largely aligned, there is a
good chance that the effort will be successful.
If a treaty partner facilitates or encourages the abuse, the re-
sponse should target the treaty partner, and not taxpayers who
simply take advantage of opportunities provided by the treaty
87. Letter fromGuy Vander-Jagt, Ways andMeans Comm.Member, to Don-
ald T. Regan, Treasury Sec’y (Oct. 6, 1981), reprinted in 13 TAX NOTES 1200
(1981).
88. Some industrialized jurisdictions have even followed suit. For example,
Norway terminated its own treaty with BVI in 1988––though a new treaty was
concluded in 2009, and entered into force in 2011––as did Denmark, and Japan
in 2001.
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partner. Termination can thus be categorized as a government-
centered response. These ideas are illustrated in the flowchart
below.
Figure 2: A Flowchart of Unilateral Responses to Treaty Abuse
The main idea prescribed by the flowchart is that termination
is a correct solution in instances where the abuser is the treaty
jurisdiction rather than taxpayers. Termination is not a last re-
sort response to treaty abuse. It is simply the correct response to
abuse of a treaty by a signatory state.
CONCLUSION
Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the attention
given to abusive tax schemes using double-taxation treaties. The
ensuing discourse tends to view potential responses to treaty
abuses as a hierarchical set of options, gradually escalating,
where treaty termination is a last resort option.
This article explains that responses to treaty abuse are a func-
tion of the type of abuse, and that they are not hierarchically
ordered. Additionally, this article also offers a taxonomy of po-
tential unilateral responses to treaty abuse. The argument
brought forward is that the nature of the response depends on
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the geographical breadth of the abuse, and the breadth of sub-
stantive abuse.
